This chapter gives an overview on the thinking about modularity in evolutionary biology and psychology. It is shown that, at present, there are heuristic advantages in the modularity concept that allowed to show how a modular organization of genes helps to explain ontogeny and the evolutionary organization of genetic processes while evidence for large scale evolutionary processes leading to genetic modularity is mostly restricted to mathematical modelling. While biological module concepts and the idea of mental modularity are both motivated by evolutionary considerations, there still exists a wide gap between the two. Cognitive modules have been suggested by cognitive scientists and by psychologists, so far with varying success in providing empirical evidence. It is argued that a principal motivation to postulate cognitive modularity was to include evolutionary adaptation processes and their genetic encoding in the explanation of behaviour at the expense of learning. This is shown to be a short-sighted dichotomy because adaptation in social domains is more often than not based on genetically pre-conditioned opportunistic (learning) mechanisms even with many non-human species. It is further shown that social domain modules are not informationally encapsulated or mandatory, if not studied at the time of their ontogenetic appearance and that many cultural domains are equivalent to coevolved detector-indicator systems that deserve to be studied in unison as trans-individual modules on the population level. Consequences for a psychological concept of mental modularity are discussed and a frame of definition suggested.
The allure of modularity in evolutionary psychology
The New Synthesis of psychology and biology, as it is sometimes called, is conceptually based on the notion of "module" and a modular architecture of the mind. According to Tooby & Cosmides (1992) , two central proponents of the field, there exist domain-specific realms of mental activity and associated behaviours that exhibit a form of modular structure like "a confederation of thousands of functionally dedicated computers […] designed to solve adaptive problems" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995, p. xiii) . The modules are supposed to operate on domain-specific representations (p. 70ff).
The reasons for a modular architecture of mind are, that if the mind involved only domain general mechanisms, there could not be any continuous history of evolutionary adaptation to environmental challenges that haunted mankind from their beginnings until the last millennia (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 90) . Second, they argue that learning by domain general mechanisms during an individual's life-time could not observe and embed in their processing the subtle, but fitness relevant statistical cues that are necessary to know if one's acting were
The Modularity Concept -4 -fitness-favourable or not in ancient and modern environments (p. 92). Third, domain general cognition could not master the combinatorial explosion when forced to make inferences drawing on all available information (p. 94). According to them, adaptively evolved domain specific cognitive modules can handle these tasks much better.
As an antidote to the idea of the mind as a domain general system dominating in cognitive psychology, the idea of "module" and "modularity" is indeed a plausible feature of the mind for a psychology going evolutionary. There are at least five attractive consequences of a modular mind:(a) Modularity allows to treat psychological domains as stable units; (b) it suggests a mapping of the thus derived cognitive and behavioural units upon a delimited neural architecture; (c) it operates via empirically derivable computations that can be modelled with standard mathematical tools; (d) the notion of modularity also suggests a mapping of the neural unit upon the genes that could also be modular, e.g. a connected structure of alleles, as biologists assume for body parts and features; (e) and this, finally, is a plausible and versatile idea for trying to understand how natural selection worked on an overwhelmingly complex nervous system to produce an adapted design that is able to serve several specific domain functions very well and others not, which links back to point (a).
For justice' sake it must be added that not all of the aforementioned five arguments are made fully explicit by proponents of the evolutionary approach in psychology. Points (d) and (e) are rarely explicitly discussed, but are suggested ever so subtly in the subtext of scholarly treatments of the area as they connect quite naturally to theorizing and research in evolutionary biology.
In the following we will examine some of these assumptions. In doing so we leave aside the question of neural modularity, even though it is a crucial point in evolutionary psychology's theorising. Recently there has been a heated debate 1 in response to Panksepp and Panksepp's (2000) critique of cognitive modularity on the grounds that there is little neurophysiological evidence for modules in the cortex and that it disregards the roots of cognitive functioning in 1 Evolution and Cognition, Vol. 7, No 2, 2001 .
The Modularity Concept -5 -sub-cortical neural mechanisms. We consider this discussion highly relevant in the present context, but will not expand on it. First we will highlight general heuristic aspects of a modular view in the sciences and present evidence for genetic modularity. In a next step we examine cognitive modules, the mechanisms that determine their contents as well as modularity on the individual and trans-individual level. Finally we suggest some properties that we consider relevant for defining mental modules.
The heuristic role of the modularity concept
In general, the idea of modularity is the hypothesis that reality can be packaged into more or less discrete units with characteristic properties. If this is possible there is the hope that a class of natural processes may be understood as interactions and reactions among those natural units. Within the sciences the paradigm for such an approach is certainly chemistry, which has a small hierarchy of such units that define the universe of classical chemistry. At the base of that hierarchy are chemical elements, i.e. those things that participate in chemical reactions but do not change their properties permanently by engaging in them. In other words a chemical element, say iron, can "hide" its identity when it is part of a molecule, like iron oxide, but with appropriate chemical manipulations can be retrieved from that compound and resume its original elemental properties, i.e. be iron as we know it. The next level are molecules, which are stable configurations of chemical elements. There can be different forms of molecules, depending on the atomic forces that hold it together, salts, complexes and covalently bound molecules. Finally there are messy molecules with variable composition, like iron hydroxide. The heuristic value of this scheme can hardly be underestimated as it systematizes knowledge about a vast array of natural and artificial substances into configurations of 92 naturally occurring building blocks.
Not surprisingly major advances in some sciences are linked to the identification of the basic building blocks of a section of reality. Modern biology, for instance, is based on the recognition of three fundamental entities, each playing a distinct role in the origin and maintenance of organisms. These are genes, cells and populations. Much hinges on the recognition of those fundamental units of organization, and the impotence of failed scientific concepts can often be traced to their failure of recognizing these units, or the identification of a
The Modularity Concept -6 -wrong unit. For instance the difference between chemistry, as we know it, and alchemy is basically the knowledge that not all substances can be transformed into each other. In other words the alchemist did not distinguish between chemical elements, which are un-changeable by chemical reactions, and compounds, which can be changed by chemical reactions. This distinction is fundamental to modern chemistry. Similarly, the inability of early evolutionary biology (including Darwin) to explain the origin of species (in spite of the title of Darwin's most influential book, The Origin of Species) was the failure to recognize that populations are the unit of evolutionary change rather than the individual.
Hence there is hardly a more powerful idea in science than that of a fundamental unit, namely some kind of module appropriate for the respective field of study. But there are also important limitations and caveats one has to keep in mind. For one, natural units are relative. For instance chemical elements are fundamental within the realm of chemical reactions (that means material changes within a certain temperature range), but are variable in others. For instance, radioactive decay changes chemical elements, as do nuclear reactions as they occur at very high temperature (e.g. nuclear fusion). Genes are the units of inheritance in sexually reproducing species and are not affected by genetic transmission but are affected by mutations, although generally at low frequency. Hence, natural units, even though real in a very operational, empirical way, are not absolute. They have their value in relation to a circumscribed set of processes. Any module has to be defined and understood in relation to and conditional upon a well defined set of processes, like genetic transmission, or chemical reactions. Consequently, modules and other natural units can be subject to deconstruction by inquiry into their internal structure. Modules are not limits to scientific inquiry, rather they are intermediate categories that organize knowledge.
Most of the confusion about the role of modules in scientific theorizing comes from ignoring the dependency of module concepts upon the processes within which they act as units.
Most clearly this is seen in the case of the gene concept. It originated as an organizing idea in experimental breeding. In this context the gene is a fundamental, unanalysed, unit. In molecular developmental genetics there is no real counterpart to the Mendelian gene concept. There are lots
The Modularity Concept -7 -of other things, exons, introns, promotors and enhancers etc. This discrepancy has confused a great many people, while it is clear that transmission genetics and molecular genetics refer to different processes. Transmission genetics refers to the relationship between generations, molecular genetics to the processes of gene expression in the cell. Not surprisingly the organizing concepts in these two branches of biology are different, because they try to understand two different classes of processes. We think that this fact is also fundamental to assess the value of modularity of mind ideas. Before we proceed to these concepts we want to review the modularity concepts that arose in the last decade in the context of evolutionary theory.
This might be useful as cognitive modules are often justified with reference to ideas from evolutionary theory.
Modularity concepts in evolutionary biology
In recent years the concept of modularity has emerged as a crystallization point for ideas about the evolution and organization of development (Bolker 2000; Callebaut & RasskinGutman 2002; Dassow & Munro 1999; Leroi 2000; Raff 1996; Schlosser 2002; G. Wagner & Altenberg 1996; Winther 2001) . A reason for the popularity of this concept seems to be that it captures a level of integration important in developing and evolving organisms that is outside the purview of other recognized units in biology like genes, cells and populations. Comparative developmental biology as well as morphology describes additional units that are more inclusive than individual genes or cells and less inclusive than organisms and populations. Examples are gene networks, developmental fields and characters to name a few. The modularity concept serves to fix the idea that there are these units or levels of integration, which are neither captured by the conceptual inventory of classical molecular biology nor by that of population biology.
In evolutionary biology the modularity concept has three largely independent roots. These are experimental developmental biology, comparative developmental genetics, and population genetic theory. All three of these concepts were proposed in the mid 1990-ties, which argues for their independent origins (Gerhart & Kirschner 1997; Raff 1996; Shubin, Tabin & Carroll, 1997; G. Wagner & Altenberg 1996; Zuckerkandl 1994) . Each of them gave rise to a different notion of modularity, which play distinct but related roles in developmental evolution and
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Developmental modules
In his overview of developmental evolution, Raff (1996) introduced the concept of developmental modules. The concept is related to a variety of older notions, most notably that of morphogenetic fields (Gilbert, Opitz & Raff, 1996) and developmental dissociability (Gould 1977; Needham 1933) . It essentially refers to any developmentally autonomous part of the embryo that can develop all or most of its structure outside its normal context. The operational criteria for recognizing a developmental module is therefore the ability to experimentally induce the development of the module at another location or outside the body (i.e. tissue culture). The paradigm for a developmental module is the limb bud. Once initiated, the development of the limb bud follows an autonomous path. Experimental developmental biologists know this for a long time (Hinchliffe & Johnson 1980 ). More recently it was shown that the insect compound eye is also highly autonomous, as shown by its induction at various places of the fly body by ectopic Pax-6 expression (Halder, Callerts & Gehring, 1995) . The evolutionary importance of developmental modularity derives from the fact that the developmental autonomy of modules allows two major forms of evolutionary variations. At the one hand developmental autonomy allows for temporal dissociation between the development of various body parts and thus is required for heterochrony, that is, the phylogenetic change in the time of appearance or rate of development of a character in ontogeny (Gould 1977) . On the other hand developmental autonomy also allows the deployment of the developmental modules in different parts of the body and thus allows so-called heterotopy, i.e. the development of homologous parts in different parts of the body (Sattler 1984) .
Genetic process modules
Perhaps the most important empirical generalization that emerged from comparative developmental genetics so far is the realization that similar developmental genes are involved in the development of quite disparate body plans, like in the notorious fly/mouse comparisons (Carroll, Grenier. & Weatherbee, 2001) . Furthermore it turned out that the same genes are also
The Modularity Concept -9 -used in the development of very different body parts within the same organism. For instance in mammals Hoxa-11 is used in axial and limb development as well as in kidney and female urogenital organ development. Even more surprising, not only individual genes are used over and over again but in fact whole networks of interacting genes (Gerhart & Kirschner 1997; Shubin, Tabin & Carroll, 1997; Zuckerkandl 1994) . These networks tend to serve "abstract" functions, like making or maintaining an asymmetric boundary in a field of cells or picking out a single cell for differentiation among a group of developmentally competent cells. Thus the operational criteria for recognizing a genetic process module is finding the same network used in different developmental contexts. The evolutionary importance of genetic process modules derives from the fact that they apparently can be deployed in toto in new developmental contexts by a few mutations. This is a new level of phenotypic variation where whole molecular functions can be deployed and re-deployed with relative ease.
There is a certain affinity between developmental and genetic process modules. Both recognize the context insensitivity of certain functional units in the developmental process, but there are also important differences that warrant to conceptually distinguishing between them.
Developmental modules are spatially bounded parts of the embryo that usually give rise to definite morphological body parts. For instance the feather bud leads to a feather and the limb bud to extremities. Developmental modules are also usually multi-cellular, while genetic process modules are mostly sub-cellular molecular machines, which are spatially not bounded. They are thus only functionally or dynamically individualized.
Variational modules
While developmental and genetic process modules are primarily defined through their proximate mechanistic integration and individuality, variational modules are based on the statistical notion of the genotype phenotype map. A genotype phenotype map is the relationship between genetic variation and phenotypic variation, i.e. it specifies which genetic differences give rise to which phenotypic differences (Mezey, Cheverud & Wagner, 2000; G. Wagner & Altenberg 1996) . A variational module is a collection of phenotypic traits that are variationally integrated through the multiple and hierarchical effects of one gene -an effect called pleiotropy
The Modularity Concept -10 --and independent from other such clusters by the relative lack of pleiotropic effects among them. The concept is very closely related to the notion of morphological and genetic integration.
Operationally modules are recognized through the correlation patterns of quantitative characters (Chernoff & Magwene 1999; Cheverud 1984; Cheverud 1996; Cowley & Atchley 1990; Olson & Miller 1958; Riska 1985) or by the pattern of effects of QTL 2 on phenotypic traits (Cheverud, Routman & Irschick, 1997; Mezey, Cheverud & Wagner, 2000) . The paradigm example of variational modules are the two main parts of the mouse mandible, the ascending ramus and the alveolar region. The mouse mandible is a single structural unit, i.e. it is a single bone that arises from several developmental modules (Atchley & Hall 1991) , but is ultimately integrated into two variational modules (Mezey, Cheverud & Wagner, 2000; Klingenberg, Mebus & Auffray, 2003) . The evolutionary importance of variational modules consists in their relation to patterns of natural selection (Magwene 2001) and their response to selection. Because of the high integration among the parts of a variational module, these parts or traits react to natural selection as a unit, both at the level of the selection differential as well in terms of the selection response (Magwene 2001) . In addition, their variational independence also assures that they act as independent units of phenotypic evolution (G. Wagner, 1996) .
The relationship between developmental and variational modules is not entirely straightforward. It is clear that not every developmental module can also be a variational module.
For instance each and every limb bud is a developmental module based on their developmental autonomy, but none of them individually gives rise to a variational module. The left and right limb bud give rise to two highly correlated structures, the forelimbs, because they basically express the same genetic information. Not every developmental module is necessarily also a variational module. Conversely it is not clear whether each variational module consists of one or 2 A QTL (Quantitative Trait Locus) is a region of a chromosome that has been shown to influence a quantitative trait by association between the segregation of molecular markers with trait expression (Lynch & Walsh, 1998 
The origin of genetic modularity
It is surprisingly difficult to come up with a reasonably plausible and general population genetic model for the origin of variational modularity. Similar difficulties have been found in attempts to understand the evolution of other variational properties 3 like mutation rate, recombination rate, dominance, canalisation and sex (Feldman, Otto & Christiansen, 1997; Gibson & Wagner 2000; Maynard-Smith 1978; Mayo & Bürger 1997) , but the difficulty of explaining variational modularity is even greater. Any of the classical models for the evolution of variational properties like canalisation or mutation rate only seek to understand the evolution of a single variable, for instance mutation rate or mutational variance. In contrast, the origin of variational modules requires the evolution of two opposing tendencies. At the one hand it is expected that the correlation or "integration" among the parts of a module increases or at least is maintained while the correlation between variational modules decreases. It requires integration as well as parcellation among traits at the same time.
In an important computational study on the evolution of RNA secondary structure Ancel and Fontana (2000) showed that selection for phenotypic stability alone can lead to modularity.
Ancel and Fontana found that in RNA there is a three way correlation between phenotypic stability in the sense of robustness against thermal noise, mutational robustness and modularity of the RNA secondary structure, a phenomenon that has been called "plasto-genetic congruence." Of these three properties phenotypic stability is most effectively selected, i.e. best "seen" by natural selection (G. Wagner, Booth & Bagheri-Chaichian, 1997) . The evolution of mutational robustness and modularity is a correlated response to selection on phenotypic 3 The variational properties of a genotype describe its propensity to create variation. These are the rate of mutations, the recombination rates, and the distribution of mutational effects on phenotypic characters. Calabretta and collaborators (Calabretta, DiFerdinando, Wagner & Parisi, 2003) found a structurally similar situation in a model simulating the evolution of an artificial neural network.
The network is selected to perform two independent functional tasks, the so-called "where and what" task (DiFerdinando, Calabretta & Parisi, 2001 ). The network is expected to produce two kinds of outputs, one indicating the location of an object and another its identity (shape). The model has two components. The neural architecture, i.e. the question which neurons are connected with each other, is genetically determined and evolves by mutation and selection. On the other hand the strength of the neural connections is determined by a learning algorithm based on back propagation, i.e. was acquired by each individual during its ontogeny. This model leads to the evolution of modularity. The reason is that the effectiveness of the learning algorithm depends on the neural architecture. Only a modular architecture provides the basis for successful learning. Hence modularity, which is genetically determined in this model, had a direct fitness advantage mediated through its influence on the effectiveness of individual learning. In addition, the modular neural architectures are also genetically modular with respect to certain mutations. However, the genetic modularity, quite evidently, did not evolve in this model because of its variational (genetic) consequences. All attempts to evolve modularity without learning (i.e. only with genetic mutations) failed.
This scenario is similar to the one described by Ancel and Fontana (Ancel & Fontana, 2000) in that there is an interaction between genetic modularity and plasticity or learning.
Without modular architecture the fitness of the phenotype is highly variable because the learning algorithm could not reliably find the most effective connection weights ( DiFerdinando, Calabretta & Parisi, 2001 ).
These results suggest the intriguing possibility that modularity and other properties of the genetic architecture may evolve as a side effect of the evolution of phenotypic robustness against environmental perturbations. It is thus of greatest importance to investigate whether similar congruence principles may hold for organismic characters as well. But overall the evolutionary The Modularity Concept -13 -forces, which have created the obvious modularity of higher organisms, remain obscure. In particular, attempts to explain modularity as a result of selection for evolvability have so far failed.
Cognitive modularity
The genetic underpinnings of content specific cognitive modules, if they exist and evolved by natural selection as claimed by evolutionary psychology, should in fact not decisively differ from the findings on physiological and anatomical features. However, given the many unknowns in evolutionary biology about the interdependence between genotype-phenotype map, evolution, cognition and behaviour, any such claims must be scrutinized with caution. There exist two approaches to cognitive modularity: Fodor's (1983) account of input analysers and Sperber (1994) and others' massive modularity model.
Fodor-modularity
Starting from a cognitive science and philosophical position, Fodor (1983) , besides others, introduced the formally most stringent conception of modularity in mind some time before evolutionary psychology became a wide-spread topic of research. According to his definition, the following properties apply to mental modules: (a) domain specificity; (b) mandatory operation once the domain specific stimuli are present; (c) the central system has only limited access to the module's computations, that is usually their most abstract representational level; (d) modules are fast operators; (e) input modules are informationally encapsulated, that is, they are not affected by higher level or general domain information; (f) input analysers have "shallow" outputs, such that "basic categorizations are typically the most abstract members of their inferential hierarchies that could be assigned by an informationally encapsulated visual-input analyser; more abstract categorizations are not reliably predicted by visual properties of the distal stimulus" (Fodor, 1983, p. 97) . Their outputs are phenomenological kinds, i.e. "dog"
and not "poodle"; (g) a fixed neural architecture; (h) a characteristic and specific breakdown pattern; and (i) their ontogeny exhibits a characteristic pace and sequencing.
The Modularity Concept -14 -Fodor developed his notion as an account of the working of input analysers at a relatively basic level of visual and speech perception where abundant experimental material provides evidence for his claims and he rejected the idea that a central system of the mind would be structured likewise. A central and domain general system exists besides the array of input modules, has the module's output as its input, and is responsible for integration and framing decisions in a vastly larger search space than any input analyser. Psychologically significant modules postulated by evolutionary psychologists are assumed to exist primarily in domains where cognition becomes socially and culturally relevant.
The level of such functionally individuated domains, hence, is higher up in the neural network than first-stage perception modules postulated by Fodor (1983) . In a recent update to his modularity theses, Fodor (2000) criticized higher domain modules on logical and computational grounds. According to his arguments, modules in conceptual domains such as social and cultural inferences, which are to use the output from perceptual modules, violate a number of prerequisites of his conception of modularity. For example, higher domain inferences such as cheater detection (Cosmides, 1989) are abductive inferences. 4 These inferences could not be achieved by classic computation and within an informationally encapsulated system. The representational input to such a module would need to be less domain-specific than the cognitive module itself, therefore presupposing a more general module in the anterior processing stage.
Massive modularity
A principal proponent of the massive modularity of mind-thesis is Sperber (1994 Sperber ( , 2000 .
It stands in stark contrast to Fodor's (1983) model in proposing several modular levels of mind:
Perceptual modules, conceptual modules and a system handling meta-representations. Perceptual modules are held to be similar to Fodor's account and it is the conceptual level, where the two models diverge. Conceptual modules are dedicated to particular conceptual domains and receive their input from perceptual as well as from other conceptual modules. Their operation is specific 4 Abduction is reasoning to the best explanation and "the basis of interpretative reconstruction of causes and intentions, as well as of inventive construction of theories" (cf. Wirth, 1998) .
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Above the conceptual modular level Sperber hypothesizes more complex conceptual levels, which allow second-order inferences about representations, that is meta-representations. Such modules, at the end, are responsible for interpersonal and cultural beliefs that have no direct reference in the natural world. An example of the working of a meta-representational module in Sperber's (2000) account is the "Theory of Mind"-thesis. A Theory of Mind allows to attribute beliefs and intentions to other living beings that are inferred from visible facts such as body movements and emotional signalling.
Arguments in favour of the massive modularity approach are derived from evolutionary considerations and plausible assumptions about natural selection of human cognitive abilities and behaviours. Although the particulars of this model are not spelled out in great detail, a few characteristics of modules in this view can be summarized (Pinker, 1994) : 5 (a) They have a functional engineering for a specific domain; (b) their function refers to Pleistocene humans' survival needs; (c) their abilities arise early in ontogeny on tasks that are solved easily by children; (d) their processing corresponds to a particular neural architecture or circuitry; (e) and, according to Sperber (1994) , their working is to be autonomous and mandatory given the right input stimuli.
Compared to Fodor's (1983) conception, they are not required to be informationally encapsulated, but even unite emotional, motivational and cognitive processing (Gigerenzer, 1997; Kenrick, Sadalla & Keefe, 1998; cf. also Shettleworth, 2000) . Given this all-encompassing 5 Not too surprisingly, the following characteristics have a precurser in Lorenz ' (e.g. 1978, p. 88ff) and other classical ethologists' "Erbkoordinaten" (coordinates of inheritance), even if these structures were not called modules.
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Modules and mechanisms
According to both, Fodor (1983) and the proponents of massive modularity (e.g. Sperber, 1994) , cognitive modules are based on a fixed and delimited neural architecture, but none spells out the genetic mechanism underlying their functional engineering, or the related issue of mechanisms responsible for their syntactic and semantic operation.
The mechanisms of modules can be formally decomposed into four components: a sensorium for some input quality determined with regard to the domain of life where it applies and the class of stimuli that constitute the domain; a syntactic (Turing) rule of inference; a set of parameters determining how stimulus values are to be weighed and combined according to the rule and determined with regard to the task that is to be solved in the domain; and an output as an example. Here, the input system is the part of the module reading the x values, the term
[ax+b] is the rule, the values a and b are the parameters and the values of y are the equivalent of the cognitive and behavioural output. If this example described the working of a mental module, the input system x would be tuned to a specific domain, for example negative numbers, and allow only such values to be input to the operation. If positive numbers were present, the system would be mute. The defining characteristic of mental modules is their domain specificity, whereas algebraic formulas can be applied in all contexts, a module's operational components, i.e. the rule and the parameter settings, cannot be applied to other domains. They are only operational in a specific domain and mute in others as shown in Cosmide's (1989) social contract and cheater detection study, even if its rule were formally correct to be applied in other contexts. The simple algebraic example is a straightforward illustration of the fact that there are several points in any modular processing, which may be determined either genetically or through learning to various
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Here we focus on the question wherefrom a module obtains its operational content, i.e. its rule and parameter settings. They may be either determined by genetic information or attained by opportunistic learning.
Deterministic mechanisms
With a deterministic mechanism, a module produces its output because it is genetically pre-programmed to "know" what is good and what is bad for an organism's fitness in a particular domain. The mate-detection mechanism, for example, would "know" through genetic information only which body features and which of a potential mate's psychological and social equipment, e.g. resources, are likely to indicate fitness, and the cheater detection module would innately "know" which behaviours of other's indicate potential cheating and free-riding. Its output representation is genetically determined because the domain as well as the syntactic rule and semantic parameters of the module are pre-determined. Hence, any such mechanism would work reliably once it is being set in action at its appropriate ontogenetic stage without additional learning and is often called an "instinct".
A good example is the so-called "Kindchenschema" (baby schema) where the shape and size of a baby skull in relation to its body triggers caring behaviour as an innate response in higher animals and humans (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1984; Lorenz, 1943) . The semantic parameters of this mechanism are the shape and size of the skull in relation to the body, the syntactic aspects are the context or domain where the parameters apply, in this case small exemplars of mammals, particularly of one's own species, and not non-living matter, and the resulting output is the representation "I am a baby and I need your help" with the associated caring behaviour.
Opportunistic mechanisms: Forms of learning
With an opportunistic mechanism, a neural structure constituting a module is only determined with regard to its domain, but open and opportunistic with regard to its operational content. An example of this is the well-known imprinting mechanism that makes goslings follow any animal or dummy that is present shortly after hatching time and given certain marginal
The Modularity Concept -18 -circumstances are met (cf. Lorenz, 1965, p. 54ff) . Such a mechanism where the operational parameters of what is "good" (e.g. what is good to follow for a gosling) makes phylogenetic sense where, under natural conditions, the right information is highly likely to be available at a particular time during ontogenesis and this information provides the operational content that releases a certain class of behaviour. Imprinting occurs at highly specific points in ontogenetic time, where a "window of opportunity" is likely to provide the genetically (relatively) unspecified module content to produce adaptive behaviour. 6 Although language learning by children is much more complex than imprinting the gosling's "follow-whatever-is-present-at-hatching" response, it is similar in crucial respects and illustrates opportunistic mechanisms particularly well. Children at the age of 10 months+ start to understand and later produce numerous words and at the age of three they are grammatically highly apt. During their window of opportunity for language attainment, children master the most complex language that might be naturally spoken in their vicinity (cf. Pinker, 1994) . Any adaptive cognitive module that is responsible for this feat is genetically determined with regard to the domain -vocal utterances as well as Chomskian grammar -and time -the ontogenetic window of opportunity -where the "right" class of stimuli is likely to occur. It is not determined, but open and opportunistic, with regard to the phonemes that constitute a particular language. There is a host of adaptively shaped mechanisms like this one that obtain their operational content through learning and which are essential for understanding the functioning of modules in the human mind.
At present, research on adapted mental mechanisms aka modules, particularly but not only in mate cognition, is largely restricted to establish cue lists that do not add much to our understanding of how mate cognition really works and how the mental parameters that define 6 The applicable stimuli in the imprinting mechanism in the case of goslings are not entirely unspecified. The "follow-the-mother behaviour" is a function of the similarity of the stimulus shape to the "expected" shape of a goose mother. The higher the similarity, the more durable the following behaviour (Kurt Kotrschal, personal communication).
The Modularity Concept -19 -beauty and attraction are attained (Miller, 1997) . It makes more than a casual difference for theorizing and research in any evolutionary psychology domain, whether the mechanism is conceived as genetically deterministic or as opportunistic and open with regard to some aspects of its content. In our opinion it is probably not far-fetched to imagine that in the vast domain of mate cognition at least some fitness cues might very well be opportunistically attained during later childhood and adolescence. Judgments of facial beauty, for example, reveal a preference for experimentally averaged faces, that is prototypes (e.g. Krebs & Adinolfi, 1975; Rhodes, 2003) and that varies with ethnic and ecological conditions (Brace & Montague, 1977) . In the submammalian realm, female wolf spiders (Schizocosa uetzi) show a learned preference for mates with either black or brown forelegs (Hebets, 2003) . Given such findings one may speculate that children living in Pleistocene bands had the opportunity to observe models for mates, i.e. the mothers and fathers in the band, who have already proven their fitness in procreation, as a basis for their own mate preferences (where another mechanism inhibited the behavioural shortcut of incest).
In fact, all social domains with an adaptive function such as cheater detection, Machiavellianism or "theory of mind", to name but a few, are likely to involve similar learning mechanisms and not be entirely deterministic. This is well-established knowledge in ethology.
The ethologist's rule of thumb is nicely summarized in this quote:
"[… N]o phylogenetically adapted releasing mechanism is more selective than is necessary to prevent the response from being released by another than the biologically adequate object with greater frequency than is compatible with the survival of the species. In cases in which individual experience gets an opportunity to increase the selectivity of a releasing mechanism, the latter can 'afford' to rely on The author's message for evolutionary psychology is not to expect a genetic encoding of fitness related information in greater detail than is necessary for a species', not the individual's survival; and that evolution tends to be opportunistic in exploiting relatively stable patterns in social life that are likely to provide more detailed information about target cues than is economically achieved by genetic encoding. This structural coupling between organism and environment by degree and via "open programs" (Mayr, 1974) enables subsequent generations of organism a certain amount of adaptability in changing environments beyond the long reach of deep biological change (cf. Huber, 2000) .
Opportunistic mechanisms are most likely to be found in social domains, which are highly variant across species, and less so in general adaptations to the ecological environment, which varies less across species than social patterns. Additionally it is a way to keep information about stimuli and matching behaviours more flexible than would be the case otherwise. Ethologists identified a host of such learning mechanisms in social domains in a wide variety of animals (e.g. Heyes & Galef, 1996) , which are built on the genetically encoded capacity to individually exploit regularities in the social environment. These "angeborene Schulmeister" (innate school masters; Lorenz, 1978, p. 209f) or the "instinct to learn" (Gould & Marler, 1987) is not at all simpler than genetically deterministic mechanisms, but more complex in order to warrant adapted behaviour in changeable environmental and social domains. Higher animals are genetically determined to learn.
The evolved mechanisms for learning, their domains and ontogenetic windows of opportunity, are biological facts and inconsistent with the "blank slade" view, which evolutionary psychologists (e.g. Tooby & Cosmides, 1992 ) associate with learning processes and which social science supposedly holds. Perhaps more research on modular learning mechanisms is a way to reconcile biology and social science (cf. Kotrschal, 2003) .
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A note on methodology
If it were the case that adaptively shaped modules are determined at least partly by opportunistic mechanisms, there would be considerable implications for cross-cultural, experimental and developmental research in evolutionary psychology.
Evolutionary psychologists research adaptive and modular cognition in modern humans basically has two approaches (Ferguson, 2002) : On the one hand the "bottom-up" approach by predicting present day domains from similar domains that plausibly existed for Pleistocene hunter-gatherers in their assumed environment of evolutionary adaptedness: If it is plausible to assume cheater detection being fitness enhancing in early stone-age people, modern human's performance in cheater detection is likely to be adaptively shaped. On the other hand there is the "top-down" approach stating that, if present-day functional behaviours and cognitions can be explained by supposed adaptive problems in the past, evolution is likely to have played a role in shaping it (Ferguson, 2002) . This approach identifies domains and representations that serve homologous functions across cultures (see later section). None of these approaches, however, is sufficient to account for mental modularity as long as its particular status in ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic development is not shown.
Behavioural homologies and modular functioning appear as abilities arising early in ontogeny such that the tasks are solved easily by children (Pinker, 1994) . Hermer and Spelke's (1996) research on spatial reorientation in children and adults illustrates the importance of the ontogenetic perspective particularly well. The authors show that children use only geometric properties of the environment for their orienting response just as adult rats (Margules & Gallistel, 1988) , non-human primates and fish do (Sovrano, Bisazza & Vallortigara , 2003) .
Adult humans additionally employ non-geometric features of the environment, such as colours, surface patterns and object categories for orientation. Hermer & Spelke (1996) suggest that the cognitive unit active in children and rats in the reorienting response can be understood as a phylogenetically homologous module that constitutes only a basic cognitive outfit of humans. In adults, this basic module is amended through experience that allows reorientation to become The Modularity Concept -22 -much more flexible in our modern artefactual environment and less modular and task specific (Hermer & Spelke, 1996, p.228f) .
Hence, even if we have good reasons to suspect an innate cognitive module at work, it is very likely that its operational content is being enriched by learning and the aid of a general cognitive system to produce the social behaviours we observe in adult humans. Judged only by adult human reorientation behaviour, the fact that geometric patterns of the environment are the input to a reorientation module with deep phylogenetic roots, could hardly be established.
Representations being put out by largely genetically shaped modules become progressively redescribed during ontogeny (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994) . Representational re-description makes domain-specific representations available to other parts of the mind and other domains. Such a process is likely to blur distinctions between adaptive domains and the general cognitive system in adults.
Further, whether a human cognitive ability can be shown to be shaped by genetic determinism or by opportunistic learning mechanisms, in the vast majority of cases it will not be designed from scratch, but be a design modifying and extending abilities that existed in phylogenetically earlier species. This is true for the learning mechanism itself as well as for the supposedly most human of all abilities, namely language. Dunbar (1996) makes a strong case in showing that there is a straight line of development from the grooming and signalling behaviour of monkeys to human language and gossiping. Recent research even suggests there exist homologous brain regions, i.e. Wernicke's and Broca's areas, in humans and in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) (Gannon, Holloway, Broadfield & Braun, 1998) , Bonobos (P. paniscus) and Gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) (Cantalupo & Hopkins, 2001) , that might serve a similar communication function in all four species. Such examples underline the methodological necessity of evolutionary psychology to search for homologies of human cognition in abilities of infra-human species. Tracing the phylogenetic roots of cognition and linking them to social conditions and physical environment, in our view, is a more promising inroad to modular analysis than unavailable specimens of Pleistocene man.
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Individual and trans-individual modularity
For the continuing discussion we turn to mate detection and courtship as a specific example of modularity. It is a heavily researched domain (e.g. Buss, 1992; Miller, 1998) and relatively uncontested in its biological as well as cultural importance, which makes it a prime candidate for evolutionary and modular thinking. We will discuss this domain in terms of some of the afore-listed criteria of modularity. In doing so, we can safely assume high importance for Pleistocene survival needs since mate detection is a necessary part and parcel of the life of all sexually reproducing species and, hence, also of our homo ancestors. Without successful mate detection, selection and finally mating, there is no reproductive success. The fact of sexual reproduction entails sexual dimorphism to various degrees as well as adaptations that are driven by sexual selection processes in our evolutionary history (Trivers, 1972) . Therefore any mating related modules can be expected to be sex-specific and complementary on the social level.
Informational encapsulation and mandatory operation
Cognition operates within an organism, whose working includes a myriad of physiological processes, which psychologists habitually disregard; and, to a certain extent, with good reason.
However, natural selection and other mechanisms of evolution, are holistic and unlikely to affect neural/mental features separately from other biological properties of the organism. As a consequence, evolutionary psychology can hardly avoid an organismic view that includes nonmental processes as long as they are proximal to psychological functioning in general and cognition in particular. From this organismic level some hitherto unquestioned properties of cognitive modules cannot be entirely maintained.
Cognitive mechanism of mate detection, for example, violate basic preconditions of modularity in being not mandatory in their operation (Fodor, 1983; Sperber, 1994) :
Contemporary findings in the domain of mate cognition show that the operation of at least some input analysers is not mandatory but contingent on the internal state of the individual. For example, women show differential preference for male faces depending on their menstrual status (Johnston et al., 2001) . Neither are they informationally encapsulated (Fodor, 1983) : Some input analysers work in parallel or not, contingent on hormonal body states. That is, they are not
The Modularity Concept -24 -informationally encapsulated with regard to chemical pathways in the body. Women, for example, show a significant positive correlation between their judgments of male face attractiveness and sexiness of male body odour only when they are in the most fertile phase of their menstrual cycle (Rikowski & Grammer, 1999) . Further, they are not informationally encapsulated because visual and olfactory cues interact with each other. Several studies (reviewed in Kohl, Atzmüller, Fink & Grammer, 2001) show pheromone perception to influence general social and sexual cognition and associated social interaction, where the hormonal status of men and women provides the link between olfactory-cognition and the visual-cognitive analysers.
Whereas these results were obtained mostly from attractiveness judgments by otherwise uninvolved subjects, there are alternative findings that point to a certain degree of the module's mandatory operation under certain conditions. A series of studies on sexual behaviour has revealed that knowledge about AIDS risks and risk prevention through condom use does not effectively determine protected intercourse (Breakwell, Fife-Schaw & Clayden, 1991; Breakwell, Millward & Fife-Schaw, 1994; Fife-Schaw & Breakwell, 1992) . It looks as if a motivational (sub-cortical?) instance in a hierarchy of mating related modules takes more control of the behaviour in situations, where a person is proximal to the consumatory behaviour particularly in younger people by shunting rational deliberation, which, together with young male's tendency to risk taking, leads to unprotected mating. This aspect points again to a developmental aspect in the working of modules.
These findings show that cognitive processes are not restricted to the visual and auditory realms -the prime targets of psychological cognition research -but integrates also olfactory cognition, which takes a role in controlling visual and auditory cognition; and that cognitive processes are not restricted to neural, but complemented by chemical pathways, which modulate their working in a way that renders classic conceptions of neural-only information processing questionable. Input analysers do not exist in isolation from the wider organism, but work in coordination and integration with analysers from other sense domains. Additionally, their operation is not strictly mandatory, but contingent on cues from internal body states, external
The Modularity Concept -25 -social conditions, age of the person and proximity to a mating opportunity. Mate cognition seems to perform a complex and situated integration of cues from many sense inputs and stimuli to arrive at social and inter-sexual behaviour.
Domains and culture
The discussion up to here was exclusively on mate detection. The mating domain, however, is not only determined by the detection mechanisms, but also by a range of indicator stimuli in the other sex to which detection is tuned. Both parts together circumscribe the domain of courtship and mating. In biological terms the indicator and the detection sides of mate cognition follow different trajectories in their evolution. According to the distinction between general adaptations and indicator-adaptations the mate detection mechanism would be a general adaptation, whereas the cues to which the detection mechanism is tuned would be an indicator adaptation (Miller, 2000) . General adaptations such as mate cognition are high in efficiency, complexity and modularity, and low on phenotypic and genotypic variance, and therefore universal in historical and cultural terms. In contrast, indicator adaptations are highly efficient and highly variant in pheno-and genotype, but low in complexity and modularity, and in some form less universal (Miller, 2000) .
If we assume that sexual selection is driven by fitness maximization due to "good genes" 7 mate indicator traits are first and foremost physical traits such as, for example, primary sexual features, physical force, facial symmetry and body odours, as well as strategic and revealing handicaps. Since most of these indicators have behavioural components it is here where culture enters the picture.
Adornments, body ornaments, cosmetics, symbolic or physical breast and penis enlargement, hip and belly "control", body building, male and female competition, conspicuous consumption, struggle for alpha-positions, and many other cultural features have long been recognized as ultimately serving mating and reproductive success. Their particular expression is 7 The "good genes" theory in sexual attractiveness is, in fact, not very well experimentally supported, but neither is the competing theory of gene drift and run-away evolution.
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Sets of these behaviours can be classified as variations on one and the same narrow theme in addressing either enhancement of physical and/or sexual features by physical or symbolic means; or they address the issue of strategic handicaps. 8 Finally, courtship behaviour is not only context dependent with the genus Panorpa, i.e. scorpion flies (Thornhill, 1981) , where the male achieves copulation either by offering a dead insect or a ball of hardened saliva or by force, depending on its abilities and environmental conditions, but of course, even more situated in humans. Human judgment on whether to court and mate or not, hence, depends on a great variety of conditions that are being evaluated through (abductive?) cognitive inferences. 9
One can call these functionally equivalent sets of behaviours a cultural complex or cultural domain, that is a kind of structural homologues across cultures (Bourdieu, 1980; W. Wagner, 1994 W. Wagner, , 1998 . Cultural complexes are patterns of behaviour that are likely to be either strongly ritual and/or coordinated and concerted among conspecifics as well as regulated in most cultures. They are a complex of functionally interrelated social behaviours that form a salient and conspicuous unit with a widely agreed social function and a hegemonic representation maintained by most "normal" members of a group. As truly "natural kinds" of behaviour patterns they make cultural phenomena intelligible to individuals. Even if their particular expression differs in form across cultures, they are homologous with regard to their function. 8 Nowadays it is even becoming viable to address the issue of revealing handicaps (that are by traditional definition not manipulable) through the use of genetic screening and/or genetic modification, if not for oneself, then at least for ones offspring.
9 Perhaps the origins of symbolic culture lie less in a spontaneously evolved symbolic capacity of mankind out of the blue but in an ever so slowly developing capacity to manipulate and exaggerate strategic handicaps and to inflate fitness indicating features by behavior and ornament. Behaviors that had a very real and physical reproductive function during aeons might quite naturally have converted later into what we nowadays call symbolic culture that, to some degree, became relatively detached from its reproductive function.
The Modularity Concept -27 -Examples are courtship and marriage, child rearing, kinship systems, contracts and agreements, warfare (against out-groups), resource accumulation, eating arrangements etc. Other cultural complexes that are more or less discouraged despite some evolutionary bases are (in-group) homicide, (in-group) theft, forced copulation, prostitution, pornography etc. Both classes of cultural complexes have in common to be morally charged and strongly invested with resources that a group allocates to their regulation.
It is not improbable that cultural complexes of, e.g., mate indicator systems and related analysers, plus assortative mating strategies, entail co-evolutionary selection pressures (Laland, 1994) . Their effect may be to stabilize ethnic groups through preferential in-breeding, particularly if in-group mating preferences are further encouraged by social norms -whatever their origin may be -as can be observed in various regions of the world (cf. Futuyma, 1998, p. 237f) . Ethnic groups resulting from the fact that indicator systems have high phenotypic variance and high heritability, are likely to differ also in other cultural fields than mating preferences, which further increases the likelihood of in-group mating.
Societies are populations endowed with culture that have been shaped by history. It is therefore not surprising that indicator systems vary widely and with it the mate choices of adults.
As powerful as evolution might have been in creating mate detection mechanisms, adult members of social groups are well-advised to consider contemporary mate indicators in their search for partners. Hrdy (2000) argues that, in their mate choice, women constantly adjust to changing historical conditions in a way that transcends their supposedly innate preferences. She asks why women should have developed a preference for wealthy providers, if wealth usually is only accumulated at older age and when these men then are likely to deliver a higher load of mutations with their sperm that represent a risk to procreation? The author explains such preferences by "patriarchal", that is, historical constraints. Historical constraints together with social and natural circumstances probably underlie many so-called "irregularities" in mating preferences, such as formal and informal polyandry, as indicated by the high incidence of misattributed paternity and its inverse correlation with socio-economic status (Baker, 1999) .
The Modularity Concept -28 -Historical conditions are also likely to play a role in the high cross-society variance of questionnaire data on male and female jealousy (e.g. Bohner & Wänke, 2003 ).
Mankind's phylogenetic inheritance is most clearly visible in children's ontogenetic achievements when adapted mechanisms are set in action, which later broadly define the structure of cultural domains. Learning through domain specific modular mechanisms as well as through a domain general cognitive system allows for a contemporary cultural expression beyond the constraints that govern infra-human species. Juxtaposing biology and culture, where the former is innate and the latter learned, is hardly an enlightened position and it blurs the fact that culture is evolution by different means.
Trans-individual modularity
The "social brain" hypothesis and its evidence attests that primates evolved their brain's size and higher mechanisms rather as a response to the challenge of complex social worlds than of physical environments, highlighting the importance of sociality in biological evolution (e.g. Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998) . As mentioned before, this development entailed the evolution of a cultural system in the human species, which incorporates the rules necessary for maintaining group cohesion and keeping individual fitness maximisation at the cost of others at bay.
Whatever cultural complex resulting from this process we pick out, we will see that its associated behaviours belongs either to the indicator or to the detection class of behaviours. The goal of indicator behaviour is to maximise the actor's attractiveness, trustworthiness, etc. while detection needs to discriminate veridical indicators from fake, be it in the mating domain, in the social contract domain or in any other social domain with complementary behaviours. In the long run, these interdependent adaptations are interlocked in a co-evolutionary process (c.f. Laland, 1994) .
Research that studies a detector system in a culture, hence, depends on the matching indicator system and, vice versa, every study on indicators depends on a specifically tuned detector system. The indispensable interdependence among the systems affords the question whether the involved mechanisms can and should be treated as separate entities on the individual level or as a modular structure on the trans-individual or population level. For example, in the case of courtship and mating it is not the behaviour of one, but the coordinated interaction of two heterosexual partners, which figures as the behavioural unit of biological selection in the most fundamental sense, that is, to result or not to result in fit offspring. For this result to occur, the entire cultural and symbolic "machine" -including moral control -of the mate selection complex counts as a focus of natural selection.
The approximately 35,000 years of symbolic cultural expression with their 2,000 or more generations of mankind are probably enough to count as a time-span in which the culturally shaped complex of mate-selection can have played a role in human evolution. Even if the means available to stone-age people for enhancing mate-indicator traits were rather restricted compared to modern possibilities, certain strategic handicaps are likely to have been employed (such as cosmetic body ornament, adornment and mutilation, symbolic breast and penis enlargement, etc.) that have an impact on mate detection behaviour and whose veridical detection was a key to increased mutual fitness (cf. Laland, 1994 Laland, , 2002 .
Another example is Hamilton's (1963) argument of inclusive fitness, where altruism towards a kin helps to promote at least part of the altruist's genes. The altruist's detection and the kin's efforts to be detected as such must match in a veridical way to produce the adaptive outcome. In the same vain, Humphrey's (1997) extension of Hamilton's (1963) 
argument
The Modularity Concept -30 -makes it plausible that altruistic behaviour towards altruistically minded non-kin promotes the genes of a shared trait for "behaving altruistically to others who share this trait".
In co-operative domains natural selection is holistic in selecting those individuals whose interaction with others was adaptive not only for themselves, but also for others through a veridical match between detecting and indicating. In all examples the trans-individual mechanism -or trans-individual social module -of indicator/detection match is the focus of a social domain and of a co-evolutionary link extending modular thinking to the population level.
Conclusion
Natural selection acts on phenotypes, including behaviours, and the selective advantages to genes are mediated through the network of interactions that result from the activities of phenotypic traits on all organismic levels. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that "low level perceptual mechanisms are not the building blocks of psychological adaptations…, but the last and most indirect products of selection pressures" (Miller, 1997) . This highlights a shortcoming of a purely cognitive orientation where behaviour figures only as "marking behaviour" on scales and questionnaires supposed to indicate cognition processes and which does not observe real world behaviour in cultural domains. Human ethology with its long research tradition and emphasis on physiology, behaviour and cross-species homologies, hence, remains an important corrective for any evolutionary psychology. Any integrated theory resulting from such an hybrid science would well be worth the effort (Caporael, 2001 ).
There is some strong evidence that genetic modularity exists at least for some anatomical features and mathematical modelling shows genetic modularity to emerge in evolution under certain circumstances. It is plausible to assume similar processes to operate also on the genetic bases of behaviour if it is strongly enough fitness-related and therefore domain specific (cf. Calabretta, Nolfi, Parisi & Wagner, 1997) . We have further argued that the present concept of cognitive modularity in social domains needs to be clearly differentiated from Fodor's (1983) conception of perceptual analyser modules. In crucial domains such as mate detection information pathways comprise, besides visual and auditory, also olfactory pathways as well as little understood chemical pathways that link perceptual processes to functional body states. This
The Modularity Concept -31 -is most probably not a unique characteristic of the mating-domain, and it shows that domains with a long phylogenetic history of functional homologies have a complex structure that defeats cognitive-only analysis.
Culture patterns are the key to determine social domains as candidates for evolutionary analysis. Ideally, adaptively relevant domains in culture are universal with regard to a clearly delimited function. The functions of such domains are rarely visible at the surface and usually hidden in culture specific rituals and representations, which a developmental perspective can help to dismantle. The ontogenetic development of functional domains also allows access to the mechanisms, whether deterministic or opportunistic, that underlie the adaptation.
Wrapping up, we suggest the following characteristics of modularity in social domains. This is not to say that in order to address a cognitive function as modular it would be necessary to have data on all points. But there should be evidence and strong plausibility for a significant proportion of them. An adaptively relevant module in a social domain (a) is a functionally integrated domain of behaviour and associated cognition (b) whose operation is relatively (i.e. rather more than less) independent from the operation of other domains on the cognitive level, (c) but linked to other domains by, for example, chemical and/or sub-cortical neural pathways, (d) whose operational content and resulting output representation can be shown to be attained by a specific mechanism (that is either genetically deterministic or an opportunistic, i.e. genetically guided learning mechanism), (e) which appears at a particular time in ontogeny (f) and whose ontogenetic pace and sequencing is culturally universal, (g) which has a discernable mandatory operation and relative informational encapsulation in its early ontogenetic stage,
The Modularity Concept -32 -(h) which is homologous to a functional and/or anatomical (e.g. neural) character 10 in pre-human species, taking heterochrony into account, (i) and which is also likely to have undergone natural selection in contrast to genetic drift in the human species during Pleistocene and Holocene periods.
One corollary needs to be added:
(j) The cognitive function, operation and informational encapsulation of a psychological module may not be clearly discernible in adult human behaviour due to culturally motivated idiosyncrasies and higher mental processes that deflect or camouflage its original purpose.
As an addendum we suggest that certain domains of social interaction can be analytically characterized as modular on the population level. Trans-individual modules comprise domain specific interactions between individuals where a set of genes is promoted as a result of a mutual detector-indicator match. This analytic entity differs from individual modularity in some of its attributes, for example in depending on signalling and social communication instead of on a neuronal communication, but not in its effects.
Outlook
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, a modular view on psychological faculties can be a powerful instrument for a research program. For this to happen psychology and its evolutionary variant, it seems, has still a long way to go, particularly in developing a methodology that comprises cognitive as well as non-cognitive, developmental, biological, and cultural aspects. An integrative approach such as this will allow to conceptualise modularity on different levels of analysis that can be mapped onto each other just as evolutionary and genetic biology at present struggles for a shared language. A clear concept is a prerequisite to avoid inflation of potential cognitive and behavioural candidates for evolutionarily defined modules 10 G. Wagner (2001) gives an overview on the meaning of the character concept in evolutionary biology.
The Modularity Concept -33 -and not to repeat a development that for so long has hampered psychology's progress at the beginning of the 20 th century, where literally thousands of emotions, instincts and drives were "identified" on grounds of plausibility.
The real problem at present is to separate the bath water from the baby, and the intellectual challenge seems to be to identify what the heuristic function of module thinking can be in an evolutionarily informed psychology. Thinking in terms of modules makes only sense if there are clear criteria for conducting a conceptual analysis of a candidate domain and for research on it.
In biology the heuristic function is to provide a conceptual locus for thinking and research into the causal role of organismic organization; quasi an alternative to wholesale reductionism as the dominant mode of thinking in the sciences. In psychology the heuristic function lies in setting limits to "anything goes", an impression, which a casual observer of contemporary psychology's progress might easily get. If well-done, insight into the naturally developed structure of the mind and human behaviour promises to give directions to much of present-day arbitrariness in psychological and social science theorizing (Kotrschal, 2003) and can result in a productive and sustainable research program in the long run; and it can do so without negating a domain-general cognitive machine, we hasten to say. Any success of such a program based on a realistic conception of modularity will come from the fact that it is structurally similar to reductionist proclivities in being atomistic. But at the same time it is an atomistic view of the world at higher levels of organization. Any scientific theory has to identify some natural kinds which provide the basis for theory formulation and which is the grist of a research program as well as the language for the explanatory narratives that come out of it. Hence the question is, despite all existing problems with modularity, what else but some kind of modules or other natural organizing units are imaginable for genes, minds and cultures?
